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Heidi Reamer Anderson*
In United States v. Jones, five concurring justices expressed their
forward-looking discomfort with law enforcement's warrantless use of
surveillance technologies in public. The source of the justices'
discomfort was two-dimensional- "easy and cheap" search technologies
were problematic because they increased the intrusiveness of and the
duration of public surveillance. Although the justices carefully
explained their concerns, they did not identify any Fourth Amendment
precedential hooks on which to hang those concerns. Accordingly, the
concurrences left two key questions unanswered: (i) what is it about
extended, warrantless public tracking that makes it feel so intuitively
unreasonable, and (ii) is there support for that intuitive feeling in prior
Fourth Amendment cases?
In this essay, I suggest that extended, warrantless public tracking
feels so intuitively unreasonable because it equates to virtual "body
snatching. " Body snatching occurs when warrantless tracking is so
personally intrusive, over such a long period of time, that it feels very
much like a physical detention in public. Thus, in searching for the
missing Fourth Amendment precedential support for the Jones
concurrences' intrusion and duration concerns, I suggest that the Court
consider United States v. Place. In Place, the Court required a finding of
probable cause prior to the seizure and dog sniff of luggage due to the
intrusiveness of and length of detention associated with, the luggage
seizure. Similarly, the Court soon could find that warrantless, public
tracking is not a search unless the intrusiveness and duration of the
tracking cross lines similar to those crossed in Place. Using Place in this
fashion would provide a solid foundation for restricting warrantless GPS
tracking while also providing familiar certainty to law enforcement.
* This essay arose from my participation in the AALS Criminal Justice Section's
"Technology and Crime" panel at the 2013 annual meeting and the associated discussion of my latest
article: Plotting Privacy as Intimacy. Thus, I owe special thanks to the participants in, and attendees
of, that panel. I also am thankful for the generous feedback provided by workshop participants at the
Stetson Florida Faculty Scholarship Forum. All errors are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
Law enforcement's use of surveillance technology in public has reached a
tipping point. Before this point, law enforcement inefficiencies served as
guardians of individual liberty.' Due to cost and time constraints, comprehensive
public tracking methods like global positioning service [GPS] transmitters or aerial
drones previously were reserved for only the most dangerous suspects and areas. 2
Now, technological advances have lowered public surveillance's costs.3  As a
result, the number of people subjected to intrusive and lengthy public surveillance
is growing. It no longer is an impersonal and distant "they" that's being tracked
anymore; it is all of us. 4
This two-pronged concern over the increased breadth and depth of public
surveillance was at the core of the two concurring opinions in U.S. v. Jones.' Both
concurrences noted that the Fourth Amendment's analytical landscape had shifted
now that tracking technologies were so "easy and cheap."6 Both concurrences also
1 See U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) ("In the pre-computer
age, the greatest protections of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory, but practical.
Traditional surveillance for any extended period of time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely
undertaken."). For an in-depth discussion of the majority and concurring opinions in Jones, see infra
Part I.
2 See id. at 963-64 (Alito, J., concurring) ("The surveillance at issue in this case-constant
monitoring of the location of a vehicle for four weeks-would have required a large team of agents,
multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance. Only an investigation of unusual importance could
have justified such an expenditure of law enforcement resources.").
3 See id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) ("[GPS tracking] [d]evices like the one used in the
present case, however, make long-term monitoring relatively easy and cheap."); id. at 956
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("[B]ecause GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional
surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that
constrain abusive law enforcement practices: limited police resources and community hostility.")
(citing Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)).
4 See Stephen E. Henderson, Real-time and Historic Location Surveillance after United
States v. Jones: An Administrable, Mildly Mosaic Approach, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 803,
808 (2013) ("Now that technology has removed the formerly significant resource restraints on
tracking location, it is possible to track all of us."). This concern regarding the use of search
technologies on everyone, including the Supreme Court justices themselves, emerged multiple times
in the oral arguments in Jones. See Peter Swire, A Reasonableness Approach to Searches after the
Jones GPS Tracking Case, 64 STAN. L. REv. ONLINE 57, 57 (2012) (noting how "Chief Justice
Roberts asked, 'You think there would also not be a search if you put a GPS device on all of [the
Justices'] cars, monitored our movements for a month?"'); id. (citing Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964)
(quoting Justice Breyer's remark that, if the government won its case, "then there is nothing to
prevent the police or the government from monitoring 24 hours a day the public movement of every
citizen of the United States" which "suddenly produce[s] what sounds like 1984").
5 In Jones, all nine justices agreed that the government's warrantless use of a GPS tracking
device for over a month violated the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (2012); see infra Part I for an in-depth discussion of Jones.
6 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito J., concurring); see also id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
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emphasized the potentially "intimate" picture painted by these technologies when
used over a long period of time.' Although the justices carefully explained these
forward-looking concerns, they did not clearly identify the Fourth Amendment
precedential hooks on which to hang them. Accordingly, the concurrences left two
key questions unanswered: (i) what is it about extended, warrantless public
tracking, that makes it feel so intuitively unreasonable, and (ii) is there support for
that intuitive feeling in prior Fourth Amendment cases?8
In this Essay, I argue that extended, warrantless public tracking feels so
intuitively unreasonable because it equates to virtual "body snatching." Body
snatching occurs when the effects of tech-savvy public tracking are comparable to
the effects of more familiar, physical searches and detentions of a person in public.
Accordingly, when looking for precedential hooks for the body snatching concerns
voiced in the Jones concurrences, courts and legislators should look to physical
search and seizure cases like United States v. Place, which focus on the
intrusiveness and duration of the search and/or seizure.9 I recommend reliance on
Place because it likely would provide a solid foundation for what currently feels
like mere intuition, while also providing familiar certainty to law enforcement.
The remainder of this Essay unfolds in three parts. In Part I, I discuss the
majority and concurring opinions in Jones. I conclude that what seemed to trouble
the concurring justices the most was the intrusiveness and duration of the public
tracking. In Part II, I show how these intrusiveness and duration concerns
generally align with the concerns at the core of Place. First, in Part II.A, I explain
the Court's overall decision and key reasoning in Place.10 Next, in Part II.B, I
show how the concerns expressed in the Jones concurrences dovetail nicely with
the constitutional concerns and analytical framework already established in Place.
Finally, in Part III, I briefly conclude that Place could help the Court properly
restrict the warrantless use of public surveillance technologies without crippling
the effectiveness of law enforcement.
' See infra Part I.B.
See Swire, supra note 4 ("The split in the [Jones] Court revealed ongoing uncertainty about
the broader questions raised in the Jones argument-particularly regarding how 'to prevent the police
or the government from monitoring 24 hours a day.' Jones could be decided narrowly because the
case involved a physical intrusion of a defendant's car. Much of modem surveillance, however,
occurs without any similar type of physical intrusion. The unanswered questions from the Jones
argument thus suggest that the Court is seeking a new, as-yet unarticulated way to constrain police
and government discretion to conduct unprecedented surveillance.").
' 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (dog sniff of a person's seized personal property); see infra Part II.A
for a summary of the Court's reasoning in Place and Part 1I.B for a discussion of how that reasoning
connects to the concerns expressed in the Jones concurrences.
10 Id. (discussed in Part II.A, infra).
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1. THE Two KEY CONCERNS IN JONES-INTRUSIVENESS AND DURATION OF
PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE
This Part briefly dissects the majority and concurring opinions in Jones."
Regarding the latter, this part shows how the intrusiveness and duration of the
public tracking of the defendant were what the concurring justices found most
troubling. Understanding the two main rationales in Jones is a necessary
prerequisite to seeing how the concurrences connect to the precedent of Place, as
discussed in Part II. The majority opinion in Jones is the first step toward reaching
that understanding.
A. The Majority Opinion in Jones
In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court ruled that the government's
warrantless, GPS-based tracking of a drug suspect's vehicle was an
unconstitutional "search."1 2 Some initial commentary on Jones focused on the
majority's surprising reliance on physical trespass as its precedential hook.13
Justice Scalia, writing for that majority, emphasized how law enforcement
"physically occupied private property" when it attached the GPS device to Jones's
car.14 Because the government "encroached on a [constitutionally] protected area,"
a search had occurred.15 The majority did not address whether that search was
"reasonable" because the government had forfeited that argument below.16 The
majority also neglected to apply the familiar reasonableness test from Katz because
it believed that the physical trespass negated the need for that test.' 7 Although all
nine justices joined in ruling for the defendant, five justices joined two
concurrences-one penned by Justice Sotomayor and another penned by Justice
Alito, joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan.
" 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
12 Id at 949 ("We hold that the Government's installation of a GPS device on a target's
vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements, constitutes a 'search."').
1 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History ofFourth Amendment Searches, 2013 SUP. CT.
REV. 67 (2013). Orin Kerr convincingly suggests that the Jones Court's reliance on trespass was
misplaced given the Court's previous mischaracterizations of the alleged trespass test as expressed in
prior property-related search and seizure cases. Id. at 74-79 (chronicling the disconnect between
Justice Scalia's use of prior cases and the actual principles set forth in those cases).
14 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. The vehicle technically was registered to Jones's wife. Id. at 946.
" Id at 952.
16 Id. at 954.
" Id at 951.
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B. The Importance of the Jones Concurrences
Because the Jones concurrences reflect the current thinking of a five-member
majority, they may illustrate how the court is likely to rule when a public tracking
case with no physical intrusion presents itself. At least one commentator believes
that this "shadow majority" could usher in a fundamental change in the way Fourth
Amendment cases are evaluated.' 8 Specifically, Orin Kerr has suggested that the
concurring opinions endorse a new theory of the Fourth Amendment.'9 According
to Kerr, courts previously asked whether each "isolated step[]" used by law
enforcement was a search, regardless of how much or what kind of information
ultimately was collected by that step or sequence of steps.2 0  The Jones
concurrences allegedly deviated from that previous step-by-step approach.
According to Kerr, instead of examining each step individually, the concurring
justices in Jones were willing to consider "whether a set of nonsearches aggregated
together amount to a search because their collection and subsequent analysis
creates a revealing mosaic."2' Kerr labeled this new aggregate approach to the
Fourth Amendment the "mosaic theory."22
Although it is possible that the concurring justices were signaling their
willingness to embrace an entirely new theory of the Fourth Amendment, I believe
they more likely were signaling something less revolutionary. I believe that the
concurring justices remain relatively content with the traditional, step-by-step
approach to evaluating whether a search occurred under the Fourth Amendment.
However, they may no longer be content with evaluating the reasonableness of
those searches under the "no privacy in public" rule as currently applied to virtual
searches.2 3 The primary source of that discomfort is not the mere aggregation of
18 See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REv. 311,
313 (2012) ("The concurring opinions in Jones raise the intriguing possibility that a five-justice
majority of the Supreme Court is ready to endorse a new mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment
protection."); Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance
Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DuKE J. CON. L. & PuB. POL'Y 1, 3-4
(2012) (noting that because "both concurring opinions endorsed ... the 'mosaic theory' of the Fourth
Amendment . . . . The opinions in Jones thus open the door to a more expansive Fourth
Amendment"). The term "shadow majority" is my creation and not that of Kerr or Slobogin.
19 See Kerr, supra note 18, at 313 ("When the Supreme Court reviewed Maynard in United
States v. Jones, concurring opinions signed or joined by five of the justices endorsed some form of
the D.C. Circuit's mosaic theory."). The D.C. Circuit borrowed the term "mosaic theory" from
national security surveillance cases in an effort to describe its belief that law enforcement's
warrantless tracking of "[t]he whole of one's movements" presented different concerns than less
comprehensive tracking. U.S. v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 561 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff'd sub nom U.S. v.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
20 Kerr, supra note 18, at 320.
21 Id
22 Id Other scholars have used the term "mosaic theory" in their analyses. See, e.g.,
Slobogin, supra note 18.
23 See Heidi Reamer Anderson, The Mythical Right to Obscurity: A Pragmatic Defense ofNo
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information from various search-like steps. Instead, it is the intimacy of the
information now revealed by even a single, intrusive step taken by law
enforcement in public, such as that revealed via the attachment of the GPS device
to Jones's car.
The Court's likely solution to the current "no privacy in public" problem need
not be a re-working of the Fourth Amendment to accommodate the "mosaic
theory." Rather, a less upsetting solution would be a new link to existing cases
regarding physical searches and seizures in public. In Part II, this Essay
specifically suggests that the shadow majority in Jones consider connecting its
current concerns over intrusiveness and duration to physical seizure cases like
United States v. Place.2 4 Before attempting to make that connection, one must
understand exactly what concerns the concurring justices expressed in Jones. Sub-
part C provides that necessary understanding.
C. The Jones Concurrences-The Concerns ofJustices Sotomayor andAlito
Justice Sotomayor agreed with the Jones majority that the warrantless, GPS-
based tracking of Jones was unconstitutional because the government "physically
intrud[ed] on a constitutionally protected area" without a warrant. 25  Justice
Sotomayor was concerned, however, that the majority's "trespassory test" would
offer "little guidance" to courts evaluating "modes of surveillance that do not
depend upon a physical invasion."2 6 Accordingly, Justice Sotomayor felt
compelled to repeat the adage from Katz that "the reach of the Fourth Amendment
does not 'turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion."' 27 More
specifically, Justice Sotomayor suggested how she would apply the familiar
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test from Katz. She, like Justice Alito, would
conclude that some "longer term GPS monitoring" likely would "imping[e] on
expectations of privacy." 28
Although duration was relevant to her, the primary source of Justice
Sotomayor's discomfort with the public GPS tracking in Jones appears to be the
intimacy of the picture potentially painted by that type of surveillance.29
Specifically, Justice Sotomayor was worried about the "precise, comprehensive
record of a person's public movements" generated by GPS monitoring.30 This
Privacy in Public, 7 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. Soc'Y 543, 553-63 (2012) (chronicling the
motivations for, and effects of, the "no privacy in public" rule).
24 See infra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
25 U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
26 Id. at 955.
27 Id. at 955 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
28 Id. at 964.
29 For a discussion of the importance of intimacy in the Supreme Court's privacy cases, see
Heidi Reamer Anderson, Plotting Privacy as Intimacy, 46 IND. L. REV. 311 (2013).
30 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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record was alarming because it would "reflect[] a wealth of detail about [one's]
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations."3 ' Thus, even
so-called "public" tracking would intrude into more traditionally intimate spaces,
such as those shared with one's "psychiatrist" or "plastic surgeon" and other
intimate spaces such as "the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip
club [. . . and] the gay bar."3 2
These specific examples supported Justice Sotomayor's more general
concerns about the government's unrestrained ability to collect and use
information that "reveal[ed] private aspects of identity."33 Justice Sotomayor later
reiterated her concern about the government's ability to "ascertain, more or less at
will, [one's] political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on." 34 Finally,
Justice Sotomayor's last citation highlighted the following intimacy-focused dicta
from Katz: "What a person seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected."3 s Collectively, these excerpts
illustrate Justice Sotomayor's primary concern-that the government's newfound
ability to watch everyone's every move necessarily enabled the government to
collect information about one's most intimate activities.36 Secondarily, Justice
Sotomayor was concerned about the duration of the search in Jones. The duration
of the search was the primary concern of Justice Alito.
Justice Alito, unlike Justice Sotomayor, did not endorse the majority's use of
physical trespass. Instead of that test, Justice Alito would have applied the
traditional Katz test and asked whether Jones's "reasonable expectations of privacy
were violated."3  To Justice Alito and the three justices joining him, "what [was]
really important" was not the trespass but "the use of a GPS for the purpose of
long-term tracking."3 9  In fact, Justice Alito emphasized the duration of the
tracking at least sixteen times in his concurrence, describing that duration as
"lengthy," "long-term," "prolonged," "four weeks" long, "longer" than usual,
"constant," "a much longer period" and for "an extended period of time."40
31 Id. (citing People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 441-42 (2009)).
32 Id. at 955.
33 Id at 956.
34 id
3 Id at 957 (citing Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967)).
36 Id at 956. Even Justice Sotomayor's use of the term "GPS monitoring" in lieu of the less
expansive term, "GPS tracking," indicated that her concerns were more connected to the intimacy of
the information revealed than to the mere aggregation of a significant amount of information.
3 To say that Justice Alito merely did not join the majority's opinion is putting it mildly. See
id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring) ("This holding, in my judgment, is unwise. It strains the language of
the Fourth Amendment; it has little if any support in current Fourth Amendment case law; and it is
highly artificial.").
3 Id. at 958.
3 Id at 961 (emphasis in original).
40 Id. at 961-64.
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Applying the Katz reasonableness test to the tracking in Jones, Justice Alito
concluded that "the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most
offenses" impinges on expectations of privacy. 41 Although Justice Alito refrained
from specifying a precise line between a reasonable versus unreasonable amount of
time, he declared that "the line was surely crossed before the 4-week mark." 42
Thus, due to the "lengthy monitoring that occurred," there was a "search" even
though Jones was in public the entire time he was tracked.43
Together, the Jones concurrences emphasized two troubling aspects of law
enforcement's warrantless use of GPS tracking in public: (i) the seemingly
limitless duration of permissible tracking; and (ii) the intimate picture painted by
that lengthy tracking. Through thematic repetition and specific, tangible examples,
Justices Sotomayor and Alito showed how law enforcement officers could infringe
upon reasonable privacy interests even if they only tracked people's movements in
public. However, neither opinion provided clear precedential support for those
concerns. As Orin Kerr has noted, the duration-focused section of Justice Alito's
opinion "cites no authority" at all." Similarly, Justice Sotomayor cited no
Supreme Court precedent to support her intimacy or intrusion concerns. 45 This
Essay attempts to fill this precedential gap in Part II.
II. BODY SNATCHING-CONNECTING THE JONES CONCURRENCES' CONCERNS TO
EXISTING PRECEDENT
In Part I, I explained how concerns over the duration of permissible tracking
and the intimate picture painted by that intrusive tracking were at the heart of the
Jones concurrences. Part II demonstrates how the justices or legislators could
connect those "body snatching" concerns to existing Fourth Amendment
precedent. Specifically, this Essay suggests that the Court evaluate the
reasonableness of public tracking similarly to how the Court evaluated the dog
sniff in U.S. v. Place.46 Sub-part A briefly explains the Court's ruling in Place.
Sub-part B shows how Place could serve as the doctrinal hook for the
intrusiveness and duration concerns shared in the Jones concurrences.
41 Id. at 964. For a discussion of applying a different Fourth Amendment standard based on
the nature of the offense involved, see Christopher Slobogin, Let's Not Bury Terry: A Call for
Rejuvenation of the Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1053 (1998).
42 Id. at 964.
43 id
4 Kerr, supra note 18, at 327 ("Justice Alito's analysis is cryptic, in part because this section
of his opinion cites no authority.").
45 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955, 954-57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
4 462 U.S. 696 (1983); see infra notes 47-70 and accompanying text.
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A. U.S. v. Place
In U.S. v. Place, law enforcement detained the defendant's personal luggage
based on a "reasonable suspicion" that it contained narcotics, versus the more
stringent standard of "probable cause."47 Officers later exposed the luggage to a
sniff test by a drug-sniffing dog, which alerted officers to the presence of
48cocaine. The Place Court analyzed what happened to the defendant in two steps.
First, the Court considered whether the dog sniff was a search protected by the
Fourth Amendment. Second, the Court considered whether the warrantless seizure
of Place's personal property was permissible under the Fourth Amendment.
Regarding the dog sniff, the Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment
generally protects the privacy of the contents of one's personal luggage.49
However, that privacy interest did not bar a dog sniff because the sniff did not
require the opening of the luggage, did not involve an officer "rummaging
through" the contents of the luggage, and did not disclose the presence of anything
other than narcotics.50 Because both the "manner in which the information [was]
obtained" and the "content of the information revealed" were "so limited," the dog
sniff was not a "search" under the Fourth Amendment.5 '
Having decided that no search occurred, the remaining issue was whether
there was an unconstitutional seizure. Prior to analyzing that issue, the Court had
to decide whether to apply "the general rule requiring probable cause" or to permit
an exception to that standard, as the Court had done in Terry v. Ohio." In Terry,
the Court stated that law enforcement could conduct a warrantless "stop and frisk"
of someone who they suspected of engaging in criminal activity.53 In Place, the
Court extended the Terry rationale to seizures. Specifically, the Court stated that
the same Fourth Amendment rationale that permitted some warrantless stops of a
person also applied to permit some warrantless seizures of a person's personal
property.5 4 Thus, "reasonable suspicion" regarding whether Place's luggage
contained narcotics could support the property equivalent of a "stop and frisk" of
his luggage in certain circumstances.
To determine exactly when a warrantless seizure was permissible under this
extension of Terry, the Court would need to balance "the nature and quality of the
intrusion" against "the importance of the governmental interests" that necessitated
47 Place, 462 U.S. at 700.
48 Id. at 699.
49 Id at 706-07.
o Id at 707.
st Id at 706-07.
52 Id at 708.
53 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968).
54 Place, 462 U.S. at 705-06.
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the intrusion.55 Application of this balancing test to the seizure of Place's luggage
led the Court to find that law enforcement had "exceeded the permissible limits of
a Terry-type investigative stop."56 In deciding that law enforcement had gone too
far, the Court relied heavily on "the length of the detention."s? Given that "the
brevity of the invasion ... is an important factor in determining" intrusiveness, the
ninety-minute detention of Place's luggage was too long to be "justifiable on
reasonable suspicion," especially when law enforcement easily "could have
minimized the intrusion."58
B. Connecting the Jones Concurrences' Concerns to the Framework in Place
In Place, the Supreme Court concluded that the seizure and dog sniff of the
defendant's luggage was the kind that required a warrant.59 In Jones, five justices
of the Supreme Court appeared to believe that the virtual seizure of a person's
vehicle, and the remote tracking thereof, also required a warrant. What is
particularly striking about the concurrences in Jones is how the reasoning largely
tracked the reasoning in Place yet neither concurring opinion mentioned Place.
This Part suggests that the shadow majority of concurring justices in Jones,
position its concems within the Place framework the next time the Court considers
a warrantless tracking in public case. Further details on exactly how to do so are
discussed below. Sub-part II.B.1 shows how to connect Justice Sotomayor's
concerns to Place while Sub-part II.B.2 shows how to connect Justice Alito's
concerns to Place as well.
1. Aligning Justice Sotomayor's Concerns with Place
In Place, the Court found that law enforcement's seizure and subsequent dog
sniff of defendant's luggage required probable cause for two reasons. The first
reason was the level of intrusiveness that infringed upon one's liberty. For
example, the Place Court concluded that "the police [seizure] conduct intrude[d]
on both the suspect's possessory interest in his luggage as well as on his liberty
interest in proceeding with his itinerary."60 In Jones, Justice Sotomayor similarly
was concerned that GPS tracking would intrude upon "private aspects of identity"
in a way that infringed on one's liberty interest in making private "trips to the
psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the
strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting,
SId at 703.
56 Id. at 709.
57 Id
" Id. at 709-10.
60 Id. at 708 (emphasis added).
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the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on." 6' Thus, Justice
Sotomayor's concerns regarding effective constraints on liberty could be
connected to the Place framework.
The Place Court further noted that the seizure of the defendant's luggage
simultaneously operated as a virtual seizure of the defendant himself.62 Although
"the person whose luggage is detained is technically still free to continue his
travels or carry out personal activities pending release of the luggage," the seizure
of property "can effectively restrain the person since he is subjected to the possible
disruption of his travel plans in order to remain with his luggage."6 Justice
Sotomayor was concerned that the tracking in Jones operated as an effective
seizure of the person as well. Just like the defendant in Place, the defendant in
Jones was "technically still free to continue his travels or carry out personal
activities" while law enforcement were tracking his vehicle's every move via a
GPS device. However, the extent of the tracking in Jones, like the extent of the
intrusion in Place, operated like a seizure of Jones's person. Specifically, due to
the "close relationship" that a car shares with its owner, "[a] car's movements . . .
are its owner's movements."64 The same was true in Place-the close relationship
between the target and his luggage meant that the seizure of the luggage was like a
seizure of the person. Accordingly, Place again serves as a doctrinal hook for
Justice Sotomayor's concerns in Jones.
2. Aligning Justice Alito's Concerns with Place
The second primary reason that the Place Court found that law enforcement's
seizure and subsequent dog sniff of defendant's luggage required probable cause
was the duration of the seizure. Specifically, the Place Court stated that "[t]he
length of the detention of respondent's luggage alone" was enough to mandate a
warrant based on probable cause versus mere reasonable suspicion. In his Jones
61 United States v. Jones 132 S. Ct. 945, 954-56, (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
62 Place, 462 U.S. at 708-09 ("The person whose luggage is detained is technically still free
to continue his travels or carry out other personal activities pending release of the luggage.
Moreover, he is not subjected to the coercive atmosphere of a custodial confinement or to the public
indignity of being personally detained. Nevertheless, such a seizure can effectively restrain the
person since he is subjected to the possible disruption of his travel plans in order to remain with his
luggage or to arrange for its return.").
6 Id. at 708-09 ("Therefore, when the police seize luggage from the suspect's custody, we
think the limitations applicable to investigative detentions of the person should define the permissible
scope of an investigative detention of the person's luggage on less than probable cause. Under this
standard, it is clear that the police conduct here exceeded the permissible limits of a Terry-type
investigative stop.").
6 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956. Justice Sotomayor distinguished the tracking of a car in Jones
from the beeper-based surveillance done through a bugged container in Karo v. U.S. because the
container in Karo "lacked the close relationship with the target that a car shares with its owner." Id.
at n.8.
65 Place, 462 U.S. 696 at 709.
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concurrence, Justice Alito expressed a similar preference for line-drawing based on
time elapsed. For Justice Alito, what was most important about law enforcement's
methods regarding Jones was their "use of a GPS for the purpose of long-term
tracking."66 Thus, both the Place majority and Justice Alito concluded that the
duration of a seizure or virtual seizure was particularly relevant to determining that
seizure's reasonableness.
In elaborating on its concerns regarding duration, the Place Court
acknowledged that "seizures longer than . . . momentary ones" had been found
reasonable; however, "the brevity of the invasion" remained "an important factor
in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on
reasonable suspicion." 67 Thus, "some brief detentions of personal effects may be
so minimally intrusive"'68 as to not trigger Fourth Amendment protection. Yet, in
contrast, "a seizure of the person for the prolonged 90-minute period" in Place was
"sufficient to render the seizure unreasonable."69
Justice Alito likely would have applied his duration-based test in a similar
fashion as the Place Court applied its duration-based test. Specifically, Justice
Alito opined that the "constant monitoring" of Jones over an "extended period of
time" of "four weeks" "impinge[d] on expectations of privacy" for "most offenses"
like his.70 Thus, to Justice Alito, the "lengthy monitoring" of Jones without a
warrant, like the lengthy detention of the defendant in Place, violated the Fourth
Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.n
Accordingly, Justice Alito like Justice Sotomayor, could have relied upon Place as
a doctrinal hook for his concerns regarding the GPS tracking of Jones.
III. CONCLUSION
This brief essay attempts to isolate the two primary concerns at the heart of
the concurring opinions in U.S. v. Jones72 and connect those concerns to existing
precedent-namely, to U.S. v. Place.73 In doing so, it has shown how both lines of
cases are about protecting the public from overly intrusive and overly long,
seizures of one's property and one's person, whether that seizure is actual or
virtual. Although reasonable suspicion may justify minimally intrusive and short
searches and seizures, the duration and intrusiveness of the law enforcement
methods used in Jones, like those used in Place, likely triggered the warrant
requirement under the Fourth Amendment.
66 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring).
67 Place, 462 U.S. at 709.
68 Id. at 706.
69 Id. at 710.
7o Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963-64.
7 Id at 964.
72 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); see supra Part I.
7 462 U.S. 696 (1983); see supra Part II.
BODY SNATCHERS
In its most recent term, the Court again considered whether a warrantless dog
sniff, like that in Place, was a search. The facts in that case, Florida v. Jardines,
differed from Place in part because the Jardines dog sniff occurred on the
defendant's home porch instead of in a public airport.74 The Jardines Court
announced, as it had in Jones, that "[w]hen 'the Government obtains information
by physically intruding' on persons, houses, papers or effects, 'a "search" within
the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment' has 'undoubtedly occurred."' 75
However, Jardines was an even easier case than Jones because the area searched
always has been "'intimately linked to the home, both physically and
psychologically. . .' where 'privacy expectations are most heightened."' 76
The key to the Court's decision in Jardines was the oft-repeated sentiment
that home or home-like intrusions are special. When the home is involved, no
other factors-even the Court's prior dog-sniff decisions like Place-need be
considered. When the location searched changes from one's home porch to
another more public location, I hope that the Court returns to Place. Specifically, I
hope that the Court considers using Place's emphases on intrusiveness and
duration as guideposts. Doing so would provide much-needed certainty to law
enforcement and much-craved protection from warrantless tracking to the public at
large.
74 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1413 (2013).
75 Id. at 1414 (citing Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950-51).
76 Id. at 1415 (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)); see also id. at 1417.
("One virtue of the Fourth Amendment's property-rights baseline is that it keeps easy cases easy.
That the officers learned what they learned only by physically intruding on Jardines' property to
gather evidence is enough to establish that a search occurred.").
n See Anderson, supra note 23, at 560-63 (documenting the Court's consistently special
treatment of the home in Fourth Amendment cases).
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